Tuesday, October 22, 2002
An editorial in today's Washington Post muses whether we are seeing a "New North Korea". Written by Susan Shirk of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation in San Diego, the piece makes some good observations and a couple of questionable ones:
This is, I think, a welcome reminder that in some respects we are in new territory here. In the past the DPRK has generally refrained from publicly admitting to much of anything. At the same time, these changes aren't taking place in a vacuum. Domestic modes of behavior and international context both matter.
This is where things start to get problematic. Does she honestly believe that the people she spoke to gave her anything more or less than the official party line? Imagine writing an op-ed that included the line: "I have spoken to a number of North Korean defectors, and they said . . ." Clearly not getting the whole story here. She continues:
"Everyone I spoke to ..."? Moreover, my understanding is that while the wage and price increases do make North Korean prices closer to international prices, this was an artificial measure designed at least in part to punish those who had hoarded the old currency (by making it practically useless) and there has yet to be any announcement to the effect that wages or prices will be allowed to fluctuate according to any market imperatives, domestic or international. This may be a future step, but it has yet to happen.
Any economic reform program in North Korea faces daunting obstacles, many of which Shirk notes:
In addition, the domestic and international contexts are so different as to render meaningless comparisons between North Korea today and the PRC in the early 1980's. Simply put, the PRC in the early 1980's didn't have to compete with the PRC and its huge pool of labor; contemporary North Korea does. What comparative advantage does the DPRK have in today's globalized economy? Seen in this context, the now-revoked decision to choose Yang Bin to head the Sinuiju Special Economic Zone actually may be the result of an astute assessment that creating a shadowy haven for gamblers, smugglers and n'er-do-wells might be one of the only things (besides nukes, missiles, drugs, counterfeit money, and really cool mass demonstrations) the DPRK can offer to the world.
The editorial's conclusion:
It just occurred to me: I am unaware of a single case in which a government that seriously pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons was stopped from doing so by "a negotiated approach" and "international verification." (If anyone knows differently, please let me know). Why, especially since the recent revelations demonstrate the DPRK's contempt for previous attempts at "a negotiated approach" should we expect North Korea to be the exception? Scary thought, that.
North Korea's stunning admission that it has been cheating on its 1994 agreement with the United States and enriching uranium for nuclear weapons is the latest in a string of remarkable confessions from Pyongyang that includes an apology for the killing of five South Korean sailors in a naval battle and the admission that North Koreans kidnapped Japanese citizens.
This is, I think, a welcome reminder that in some respects we are in new territory here. In the past the DPRK has generally refrained from publicly admitting to much of anything. At the same time, these changes aren't taking place in a vacuum. Domestic modes of behavior and international context both matter.
In late September I visited North Korea for five days at the invitation of a government think tank and had the opportunity to talk with national and local officials, as well as with some ordinary North Koreans. Like other recent visitors, I came away convinced that the reforms were serious and significant, albeit at a very early and fragile stage. My background as a scholar of China's economic reforms helped me compare North Korea's measures with China's.
This is where things start to get problematic. Does she honestly believe that the people she spoke to gave her anything more or less than the official party line? Imagine writing an op-ed that included the line: "I have spoken to a number of North Korean defectors, and they said . . ." Clearly not getting the whole story here. She continues:
To lay the groundwork for structural changes, prices and wages have been raised for the first time in more than 20 years. Everyone I spoke to had received a salary increase of 10 to 20 times their original wage. Prices of goods in food markets and department stores have moved closer to international prices in what amounts to a drastic currency devaluation.
"Everyone I spoke to ..."? Moreover, my understanding is that while the wage and price increases do make North Korean prices closer to international prices, this was an artificial measure designed at least in part to punish those who had hoarded the old currency (by making it practically useless) and there has yet to be any announcement to the effect that wages or prices will be allowed to fluctuate according to any market imperatives, domestic or international. This may be a future step, but it has yet to happen.
Any economic reform program in North Korea faces daunting obstacles, many of which Shirk notes:
North Korea's early stumbles reflect its inexperience and lack of competent economists. Moreover, North Korea lacks the natural advantages -- a rich resource base and large domestic market -- that China has. Fuel and electricity shortages hamper production.
Reform-minded North Korean officials freely admit that they also confront formidable political resistance from the military.
In addition, the domestic and international contexts are so different as to render meaningless comparisons between North Korea today and the PRC in the early 1980's. Simply put, the PRC in the early 1980's didn't have to compete with the PRC and its huge pool of labor; contemporary North Korea does. What comparative advantage does the DPRK have in today's globalized economy? Seen in this context, the now-revoked decision to choose Yang Bin to head the Sinuiju Special Economic Zone actually may be the result of an astute assessment that creating a shadowy haven for gamblers, smugglers and n'er-do-wells might be one of the only things (besides nukes, missiles, drugs, counterfeit money, and really cool mass demonstrations) the DPRK can offer to the world.
The editorial's conclusion:
In this context, how should the United States handle the North Korean nuclear problem? We should not treat North Korea like Iraq (that is, threaten to use military force to disarm it and change its regime) or like Pakistan and India (give the nuclear program a pass because the country is strategically important).
Instead we should treat North Korea like North Korea: Build on its desire to reform its economy by pursuing a negotiated approach to closing down completely and finally, and under international verification, its programs for weapons of mass destruction and missiles.
It just occurred to me: I am unaware of a single case in which a government that seriously pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons was stopped from doing so by "a negotiated approach" and "international verification." (If anyone knows differently, please let me know). Why, especially since the recent revelations demonstrate the DPRK's contempt for previous attempts at "a negotiated approach" should we expect North Korea to be the exception? Scary thought, that.
