It Makes a Difference to the Sheep

NORTH KOREA "MISCALCULATED" ON ABDUCTEE ISSUE. You can say that again.

A year ago, before signing the Pyongyang Declaration, North Korea must have made certain calculations as part of its overall strategy. For one, it sought to evade pressure from the United States, which had labeled it part of the ``axis of evil.'' Pyongyang also appears to have placed great expectations on securing economic assistance from Japan.

In an attempt to rebuild its destitute economy, North Korea implemented drastic economic reforms on July 1, 2002, two months before Koizumi's Pyongyang visit. Kim Jong Il ordered the reforms in early October of the previous year. Observers believe it was around then that Japanese and North Korean officials started to secretly develop behind-the-scenes contacts, at North Korea's initiative. It is also believed that plans for the Japan-North Korea summit in September were finalized around May 2002, shortly before Pyongyang enacted its economic reforms.

In light of these developments, it seems likely that North Korea implemented the reforms on the assumption that it could obtain economic aid from Japan on the back of improved bilateral ties.

But things did not go as planned. Contrary to North Korea's expectations, Japanese public opinion of the North went from bad to worse with the revelation of abduction details. When a high-ranking U.S. official visited Pyongyang in early October, shortly after Koizumi, new suspicions emerged over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, intensifying tensions. Economic reforms appear to have inflicted rampant inflation, and in general produced disappointing results. It is thus natural that Pyongyang would want to expedite the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan.

If P'yongyang recognizes the nature and implications of its miscalculation, it could make some progress in rectifying the situation by offering some relatively painless concessions on the abuctee issue (more here).