Thursday, November 13, 2003
PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS is the title of a new book edited by Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder which examines the experiences of NGO's in North Korea. I went to the DC book launch (hosted by KEI) earlier this week. Some interesting tidbits that emerged include:
--Religious-based NGO's often enjoyed more success in North Korea than other types.
--The DPRK generally insisted that NGO's not include Korean speakers in their delegations that visited North Korea
--The process became intensely politicized (no surprise here) as food-aid became a carrot for government negotiators to offer (and DPRK negotiators to demand) rather than a separate, autonomous attempt to alleviate starvation in North Korea.
--After the 2000 Kim-Kim summit, South Korean NGO's found themselves marginalized as the increased government-to-government ties eclipsed NGO's.
--The DPRK recently requested that the EU provide 100,000 (!) scholarships for North Korean students to study in Europe (a sign on the one hand of typical North Korean demanding of concessions but on the other hand, think of what would happen to north Korea if 100,000 students actually studied in Europe and returned home!).
The general tenor of the authors/editors was fairly pessimistic. The DPRK had, for the most part, managed to insist on controlling the process of humanitarian aid, had managed to resist calls for increased monitoring of where the aid actually goes, and had shown a short-sighted but perhaps politically expedient preference for direct food aid rather than long-term development projects. No "teach a man to fish" ethos apparent here. Moreover, donor fatigue has set in and large numbers of NGO's have reduced or eliminated their operations in North Korea. The fact that North Korea can't seem to cooperate with well intentioned non-governmental groups in the vital task of providing food for its starving citizens and was unwilling to allow monitoring of where the food went does not bode well for the prospects of a deal on the nuclear issue any time soon. If North Korea can't trust outsiders to simply observe where food aid goes, why should we think that they will willingly open up sensitive defense-related operations to full inspection and monitoring.
I should note that there were some dissenting voices at the book launch. Some have pointed to gradual, incremental progress in the case of a few NGO's that have seemed to figure out the best way to win the trust of DPRK officials (often on the local rather than the central level). So, despite the setbacks and frustration, there is some cause for hope to see NGO's as engines of slow but significant change. Maybe so. But many wonder whether North Korea has the luxury of time to engage in gradual change.
--Religious-based NGO's often enjoyed more success in North Korea than other types.
--The DPRK generally insisted that NGO's not include Korean speakers in their delegations that visited North Korea
--The process became intensely politicized (no surprise here) as food-aid became a carrot for government negotiators to offer (and DPRK negotiators to demand) rather than a separate, autonomous attempt to alleviate starvation in North Korea.
--After the 2000 Kim-Kim summit, South Korean NGO's found themselves marginalized as the increased government-to-government ties eclipsed NGO's.
--The DPRK recently requested that the EU provide 100,000 (!) scholarships for North Korean students to study in Europe (a sign on the one hand of typical North Korean demanding of concessions but on the other hand, think of what would happen to north Korea if 100,000 students actually studied in Europe and returned home!).
The general tenor of the authors/editors was fairly pessimistic. The DPRK had, for the most part, managed to insist on controlling the process of humanitarian aid, had managed to resist calls for increased monitoring of where the aid actually goes, and had shown a short-sighted but perhaps politically expedient preference for direct food aid rather than long-term development projects. No "teach a man to fish" ethos apparent here. Moreover, donor fatigue has set in and large numbers of NGO's have reduced or eliminated their operations in North Korea. The fact that North Korea can't seem to cooperate with well intentioned non-governmental groups in the vital task of providing food for its starving citizens and was unwilling to allow monitoring of where the food went does not bode well for the prospects of a deal on the nuclear issue any time soon. If North Korea can't trust outsiders to simply observe where food aid goes, why should we think that they will willingly open up sensitive defense-related operations to full inspection and monitoring.
I should note that there were some dissenting voices at the book launch. Some have pointed to gradual, incremental progress in the case of a few NGO's that have seemed to figure out the best way to win the trust of DPRK officials (often on the local rather than the central level). So, despite the setbacks and frustration, there is some cause for hope to see NGO's as engines of slow but significant change. Maybe so. But many wonder whether North Korea has the luxury of time to engage in gradual change.
