Tuesday, December 16, 2003
“FAILED OCCUPATIONS” The capture of Saddam Hussein has, for the time being, dampened much of the quagmire and failure talk concerning the U.S. in Iraq. But such talk is sure to rise again in the future. I generally welcome criticism of the U.S. occupation of Iraq as an important part of democratic accountability. Much of this criticism is useful and patriotic (though as the much linked to Orson Scott Card essay compellingly argues, all of it may not be). Such criticisms should, however, be coupled with clear and specific suggestions for improvement.
It also is helpful from time to time to step back and take a look at the big picture. A recent presentation by Dr. Ronald Spector on “Failed Occupations” of the destroyed Japanese Empire after WWII raises some interesting points for comparison. Note the following:
--Soviet troops that occupied Manchuria went on a rampage of looting and raping that caused many Chinese women to cut their hair, wear men’s clothing and even disfigure their faces in order to avoid rape (paradoxically, the same Russian soldiers were also said to have been kind to children and almost never harassed a woman who had a child with her).
--The Soviets also systematically de-industrialized Manchuria taking literally everything that wasn’t nailed down (and a lot that was) back to the Soviet Union. Six months after the Soviet occupation only 20 out of 972 factories were still operationally intact.
--Hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians disappeared in the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and remain unaccounted for to this day. (Or as John Dower put it in his excellent Embracing Defeat, “Suddenly, more than three hundred thousand Japanese were unaccounted for” (52)).
The American occupation of Iraq, for all its shortcomings (of which there are surely many), doesn’t hold a candle to this type of behavior.
But before the Americans get too complacent, they might also take a look at the U.S. occupation of the southern part of Korea (divided by an entirely arbitrary 38th parallel) in which the Americans, ignorant of conditions on the ground, used former colonial officials and collaborators to create and prop up a regime that was reliably anti-communist but at times brutal to its own people. The U.S. needs to exercise extreme caution in working with members of the former regime in Iraq, a necessity perhaps but one that should be avoided if at all possible.
Americans sent to China following the war were less effective and did little to stem the rising Red tide as Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists squandered what advantages they had enjoyed in 1945. One interesting aside: American soldiers who encountered members of the CCP armies found them to be pleasant company, “that is,” recalled one soldier, “until we met them again in Korea.”
The British/Indian occupation of Southeast Asia and Indonesia was aimed at restoring the old colonial order but delays in arriving gave nationalist and anti-colonial movements to gather momentum. Japanese troops in the region often joined both sides of the fray.
Much of what happened in the late 40’s, 50’s and 60’s in Asia probably couldn’t have been avoided. I’m not one of those of the “we lost China” school. However, it is always useful to consider ways in which we might do better the next time around.
It also is helpful from time to time to step back and take a look at the big picture. A recent presentation by Dr. Ronald Spector on “Failed Occupations” of the destroyed Japanese Empire after WWII raises some interesting points for comparison. Note the following:
--Soviet troops that occupied Manchuria went on a rampage of looting and raping that caused many Chinese women to cut their hair, wear men’s clothing and even disfigure their faces in order to avoid rape (paradoxically, the same Russian soldiers were also said to have been kind to children and almost never harassed a woman who had a child with her).
--The Soviets also systematically de-industrialized Manchuria taking literally everything that wasn’t nailed down (and a lot that was) back to the Soviet Union. Six months after the Soviet occupation only 20 out of 972 factories were still operationally intact.
--Hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians disappeared in the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and remain unaccounted for to this day. (Or as John Dower put it in his excellent Embracing Defeat, “Suddenly, more than three hundred thousand Japanese were unaccounted for” (52)).
The American occupation of Iraq, for all its shortcomings (of which there are surely many), doesn’t hold a candle to this type of behavior.
But before the Americans get too complacent, they might also take a look at the U.S. occupation of the southern part of Korea (divided by an entirely arbitrary 38th parallel) in which the Americans, ignorant of conditions on the ground, used former colonial officials and collaborators to create and prop up a regime that was reliably anti-communist but at times brutal to its own people. The U.S. needs to exercise extreme caution in working with members of the former regime in Iraq, a necessity perhaps but one that should be avoided if at all possible.
Americans sent to China following the war were less effective and did little to stem the rising Red tide as Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists squandered what advantages they had enjoyed in 1945. One interesting aside: American soldiers who encountered members of the CCP armies found them to be pleasant company, “that is,” recalled one soldier, “until we met them again in Korea.”
The British/Indian occupation of Southeast Asia and Indonesia was aimed at restoring the old colonial order but delays in arriving gave nationalist and anti-colonial movements to gather momentum. Japanese troops in the region often joined both sides of the fray.
Much of what happened in the late 40’s, 50’s and 60’s in Asia probably couldn’t have been avoided. I’m not one of those of the “we lost China” school. However, it is always useful to consider ways in which we might do better the next time around.
