Wednesday, January 21, 2004

JACK PRTICHARD ON HIS VISIT TO NORTH KOREA (NYT; free registration required).
On Jan. 8, North Korean officials gave an unofficial American delegation, of which I was a member, access to the building in Yongbyon where about 8,000 spent fuel rods had once been safeguarded. We discovered that all 8,000 rods had been removed.

Whether they have been reprocessed for weapons-grade plutonium, as Pyongyang claims, is almost irrelevant. American intelligence believed that most if not all the rods remained in storage, giving policymakers a false sense that time was on their side as they rebuffed North Korean requests for serious dialogue and worked laboriously to devise a multilateral approach to solving the rapidly escalating crisis.
I wonder if Pritchard would use similar language about evidence about the DPRK's HEU program. "Whether the DPRK is actually using the centrifuges obtained from Pakistan to enrich uranium is irrelevant. What is important is that they could be doing it, so we're running out of time."

Now there are about 8,000 spent fuel rods missing --evidence that work on such a deterrent may have begun. It is just the most recent failure in a string of serious North Korea-related intelligence failures.

When North Korea claimed in 1998 to have launched a three-stage rocket to put a communications satellite into orbit, American intelligence initially denied the rocket had this capacity; and then, days later, confirmed the North Korean claim. That same year United States intelligence insisted that Pyongyang had embarked on a secret underground project to duplicate its frozen nuclear weapons program. Eight months later, an American inspection team visited the underground site to find that American intelligence was dead wrong. Then there was the intelligence in the summer of 2002 that indicated the North Korean regime was on the brink of collapse. That reporting was later recalled as faulty; but not before the damage was done.
American intelligence has clearly not done well in North Korea (or Iraq for that matter). One wonders, though, whether the DPRK is manipulating our anxiety about the validity of our intelligence to exaggerate the progress in its nuclear program in order to extract more concessions. I used to be of the opinion that the DPRK sincerely wanted nukes for their own sake, for purposes of security and prestige. Now, I cannot help but be more doubtful and skeptical of P'yongyang's claims. A viable test of a nuclear weapon would remove all doubt. Moving some fuel rods doesn't.
American policy in North Korea is hardly better than American intelligence. At best it can be described only as amateurish. At worst, it is a failed attempt to lure American allies down a path that is not designed to resolve the crisis diplomatically but to lead to the failure and ultimate isolation of North Korea in hopes that its government will collapse.
Hawk engagement anyone (more here)?
This administration must step out from behind China's diplomatic skirt and take the lead in resolving this crisis before Pyongyang creates a real nuclear deterrent. As it is now, North Korea is calling the shots.
"behind China's diplomatic skirt?" A shot at Bush's masculinity I guess but a pretty lame one. Bush's "no giving in to nuclear blackmail" forced the DPRK to drop its demand for bilateral talks and a non-aggression treaty. P'yongyang has attempted to "call the shots" by doing things like inviting Pritchard to North Korea to frighten him into writing NYT editorials but will Bush listen?
I am concerned that the next round of six-party talks will fail and Pyongyang will withdraw from the diplomatic process. It may then declare that it has developed all the nuclear weapons it needs and that it does not intend to make any more.

China, South Korea and Russia (and perhaps Japan) may well accept this new status quo, arguing that the actual threat is minimal and further nuclear activity has been suspended. And it is easy to see why this new status quo would appeal to them, given the instability that could result if the worst-case scenario of United States policy--which is to say, isolation, sanctions and possible military confrontation--comes to pass. The fragile multilateral coalition on which the United States is relying would dissolve.

The result would be a region even more dangerous than it is today; and America and Asia are even less secure now than they were a year ago. How many nuclear weapons does North Korea have to make before this administration gets serious about its policy in East Asia?
This gets at the heart of the matter. I suspect that this may actually be a likely future, perhaps the most likely. Most, Pritchard included I presume, would agree that this future is better than the doomsday military confrontation with artillery attacks on Seoul scenario. The real question is, then, is there a better future that has a reasonable chance of succeeding? Can a negotiated settlement be reached that would include an inspection regime comprehensive and intrusive enough to remove the doubt that North Korea will continue to clandestinely develop nukes while at the same time gobbling all the carrots we have to offer? I doubt it. Kim Jong Il is not likely to pull a Gadaffi anytime soon. So while Pritchard's projected future certainly isn't the best of all possible worlds, it may be the best we can get.

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